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Abstract:
After the January 25th 2011 revolution in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood
(MB) formed the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the Salafis formed several
parties, including the popular "Al-Nour Party" (The Light) party. Many Egyptians
joined the parties as they increased in popularity. On July 3 2013, however, the
military intervened and deposed the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi, the first
elected civilian president in Egypt’s modern history.
This research is guided by the broad question of how Egyptian Islamic groups
present their ideologies and principles to the Egyptian society via their websites.
Islamic movements gained popularity after Egypt’s Jan. 25 revolution and many of
them entered the political scene through forming political parties. This research will
shed light on how Islamists use the web to present their philosophies, programs, and
visions, and how the groups deal with stereotypes that Islamists are violent and
intolerant. This study will focus on two main research questions: the first, how do the
FJP and Al-Nour Party parties describe themselves and their agendas and ideologies
on their websites? The second analyzes how both groups address long-held
stereotypes against them dealing with backwardness, violence, and exclusion of nonMuslims. Many of the discourses that were found on the FJP and Al-Nour website
seem to contradict common stereotypes about Islamists that they are violent, anti
Christian, and do not respect rights and freedom of individuals.
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I. Chapter One: Introduction
A. Introduction:
Technology has become a vital aspect in the lives of many people, regardless
of background or social class. The great advance of technology has made it easy for
people to access information and knowledge and pursue social interaction. With the
high speed of technology and communication many parts of daily life have lost their
significance due to the effect of time and space (Gotved, 2006). Also, people in
different countries have become aware and more informed about events and news
happening in other parts of the world owing to electronic technology.
In Egypt, technology has made it necessary for multi-national companies,
political parties, local organizations, NGOs, and even individuals to be active online
throughout creating their own official websites and other internet pages. According to
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, official statistical agency of
Egypt CAPMAS, internet penetration reached 43 % at the end of quarter two in 2013
(Ahram online, 2013). These websites and pages contain information and data that
can have an effect on the audience’s decisions, opinions and views and can result in
affecting their actions and activities.
Strong technology development like social networking has been a key channel
for Egyptians to express their anger and protest against the Egyptian government.
Egyptians turned to the online environment as a site of political activism because of
political repression during the Hosni Mubarak era. Many Egyptians felt disappointed
by the unfulfilled promises of the Mubarak era, especially as the conditions in the
country continued to deteriorate. Many people saw little improvement in life,
especially in the areas of education, the economy and investment, tourism and health.
Complaints about the daily vital needs of people kept rising until they reached a
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climax in January 2011 when Egyptians revolted against the Mubarak regime, ousting
the dictator in an 18-day uprising. Importantly, social media platforms like Facebook,
Youtube and Twitter were outlets for opposition groups and organizations to call for
and arrange the January 2011 demonstrations (Preston, 2011).
Egypt’s post-uprising transition period culminated in the country’s first everdemocratic presidential elections in 2012 (Ishani, 2011). The Muslim Brotherhood’s
Mohamed Morsi won the June 2012 election, but his time in office was characterized
by political tumult and polarization. Many Egyptians, angered by Muslim
Brotherhood’s policies, took to the streets again on June 30 2013, and Morsi was
ultimately removed from power by the military on July 3, 2013.
The transition period that began in February 2011, and which included the
one-year Morsi period, featured serious political debates between Egyptian liberals
and Islamists about the path the country is taking. Media played a key role in allowing
the debates to play out.
In this thesis, I will be examining the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi
political parties represented in the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and Al-Nour
party, respectively. Specifically, I will analyze how these two Islamist parties have
presented their ideologies and agendas to the Egyptian society through their official
websites. To examine the websites, a discourse analysis methodology will be used
focusing on the meaning of online texts. Much has been published about how
Islamists are represented by mainstream media outlets in the West and in the Muslim
world (see Poole, 2000, Shaheen, 2001, Blasing, 1996) but comparatively few studies
have examined how Islamist movements have presented their visions, agendas, and
ideologies. This research attempts to help fill this gap in the literature.
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Although the MB party has been removed from office in Egypt, they are still
considered to be one of the most organized and popular groups in the Egyptian
political scene. This research at such time is significant to help the society understand
the philosophy and ideology of the MB and the Salafis in Egypt. It is important to
know how popular Islamists use the web to talk about themselves, especially given
that these groups have historically lacked legal status in society, have been negatively
stereotyped, and their future status as political players remains (at the time of this
writing) unclear.
B. Background:
It was noticeable that Egyptians were dissatisfied during the last few years of
the Mubarak era due to the high rate of unemployment and economic decline which
affected the lives of millions. According to the World Bank, the unemployment rate
went from 5.2% in 1980 to 13.2% in 2011 resulting in high rate of poverty, 25%
within the society (World Bank, 2013)
On Jan 25th 2011, masses of Egyptians protested against Mubarak. Although
the police forces were in the habit of preventing large demonstrations and protests
against both the President and the government, the Jan 2011 demonstrations all over
Egypt overcame the police and made it difficult for them to control (Fahim & El
Naggar, 2011). Since the governmental media channels down played the protests, the
Internet was a key tool to know and observe what was happening and organize for the
next steps (Khamis and Vaughn, 2011). Accordingly, the government cut off the
Internet for few a days to distort communication. However, the government’s denial
and failure to handle the crisis led to Mubarak’s stepping down on February 11
2011(Ishani, 2011). Hence, Egyptian political life experienced great change.
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In June 2012, Mohamed Morsi, the MB candidate, won the first post
revolution democratic presidential elections (Shabi, 2013). There were many reasons
that led to the winning of Morsi and his political party. First of all, Egyptians had
doubts about the liberal candidates as some of them were linked with the previous
regime (Shabi, 2013). This made them open to try the Islamists’ system and see how
it will affect the country. Second, the Islamic movements were gaining more
popularity since they were close to the lower classes, better positioned than the new
parties, and well organized in the society (Tadros, 2012). The Freedom and Justice
Party (FJP), had won 77 out of 156 seats and the Nour, Salafi party, 33 seats in the
parliament and were getting more attention (Brown, 2011). Western governments and
political leaders had concerns that Islamists were dominating the political scene in
Egypt, and were also concerned that Islamic political ideology would challenge the
west’s interests in Egypt and the Middle East (Hassan, 2012). Historically, the west
has tried to exert its political will in the Middle East and “westernize” Arab countries
and societies (Said, 1997).
Although the MB had a very good chance to keep Egyptians’ trust and
improve the country, they failed in the eyes of many. Various people believed that
Egyptians’ basic demands were not being considered and their daily lives were not
getting better (Stern, 2013). This pushed many Egyptians to stand up again for their
rights and call for Morsi’s removal. In June 2013, many Egyptians took the streets
marking the one year anniversary of Morsi’s inauguration. On the other hand,
supporters of the president demonstrated and held sit-ins next to Rab’a Al Adawya
Mosque and Al-Nahda Square in Giza (Collard, 2013). After four days, the Egyptian
army interfered and the president was ousted and kept in Military custody and
General Abdel Fattah Elsisi announced a transitional road map (Collard, 2013).
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Globally, many countries like Russia, the Netherlands, Germany, Turkey and
Iran didn’t approve of the military intervention and asked officials to return the
civilian president to office. Also, some EU countries threatened to cut financial aid
(Alexander, 2013). However, many countries also offered either explicit or tacit
support for the military intervention, which was described by some as a democratic
response to the will of millions of Egyptians.
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II. Chapter Two: Literature Review
A. Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi:
The Middle East as a region is the cradle of three of the world’s great
religions, Islam, Christianity & Judaism and plays a major role in all countries
(Ayubi, 1980). In the last decade, there was a revival for Islam in many countries and
movements started to demand using it as a political guidance in their societies. Due to
this rise of Islamic movements in Egypt and Tunisia, it grabbed the west’s attention
and curiosity. The world leading countries and the west were concerned towards the
increase of Islamic movements and participation in political events like strikes,
protests, and resulting in social instability (Walsh, 2003). The fear of US and western
countries is that Islamic political parties will try to hinder and fight the western
expansion in Arab societies and this will affect their policies and interest (Esposito,
1994).
After eight decades of being illegal and neglected as political opposition, the
Muslim Brotherhood, MB, survived the harsh political scene and started to seek
power and authority (Daragahi, 2013).
The MB were founded, 1928, by Hassan El Banna and was very active during
the 1930’s and 1940’s as a religious group and started to create awareness of core
Islamic values, and participated in political activities (Ayubi, 1980). Also, in 1933, El
Banna opened, Al Akhawat Al Muslimat, the Muslim Sisterhood and this is due to
their strong presence and to develop their role within social, political and cultural
aspects (Hamed, 2013).
The Brotherhood attracted and targeted their followers to be well educated and
professional and the group included many doctors and engineers. They wanted to
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appear to the west as a modern Islamic group. Yet, many of the followers were from
traditional social class as farmers and laborers (Lia, 1998).
In the book, the Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought, the
authors state that the ideology of the MB movement is based on Islamic principles and
values and it is “one of the most significant movements in the 20th century and
produced offshoots elsewhere in the Middle East like in Jordan, Syria and Palestine”.
This implies that the organization was very powerful, organized and had great
influence on other Muslim groups across the region. Furthermore, El Banna’s,
founder of MB, main objective is to use the Qur’an and Sunna as a guide and way of
life (Gul, 2010).
Beside their main ideology, the MB members and El Banna criticized the
separation of religion and politics because their vision is to use Islam as
comprehensiveness vision and a philosophy in life (Böwering, Crone, Mirza, 2013).
In addition to that, one of the ideologies of the organization is to fight and prevent
western influence “Islamic socialism” and imperialism in spreading through out
society as the MB viewed the western influence deterioration of morals and Islamic
values (Fuller, 2003).
During the 1930s the political environment was close to the elite upper class
families and society’s nobles were responsible for setting policies. Furthermore, any
Islamic associations were prohibited to practice politics or express their political
concern. However, they used issues like the Palestine revolution and the Al Aqsa
Mosque as a platform to express and criticize the foreign Egyptian policy (Lia, 1998).
The MB lacked its legal status for almost six decades, yet they are considered
the most successful political and social movement and organization due to their solid
and powerful hierarchy within the organization (Hamzawy & Brown, 2010). They
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were faced firmly under Nasser Regime and were not allowed to participate or be
active. Unlike the Sadat 1970’s, he started to give them more privilege and politically
manipulate them against the leftists (Kepel, 2005). They strongly believed building a
stable and strong infrastructure in a society comes first from principles that are stated
in the Holy Quran and can be applied universally (Moussali, 1992)
Therefore, they were the first to step up and control the political scene after
Mubarak has stepped down. Their objective was to have Sharia the main core source
of laws and would be fully implemented in the society as to face corruption, western
influence, ethical and moral carelessness. The second is to face the influence of
western countries inside our society like western banks, shops, nightclubs, clothes and
even policies (Roy, 1994).
Most of their members are from the middle class with very rare exposure to
the west that perceives Islam as an ideology more than a way of life or a guide. Most
of the Islamic movement members have been exposed to their political education and
concept in the university and getting information from different political concepts like
Marx. Furthermore, interpreting the Quran and merging it with politics made their
beliefs and concerns stronger and wanting to take over society (Roy, 1994).
After Mubarak took over power in 1981, the MB tried to be a prominent
organization and politically acknowledged. As Mubarak came to power, he adapted
his political views to the existence of the MB and other Islamic groups giving more
freedom and political participation. The MB wanted to gain large representation in the
parliament and they achieved so by political alliance with small parties at the time like
“Al-Wafd” & “Al-Omal” in 1984 and the Socialist Labour party in 1987 (Al Awadi,
2005).
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During the 1980s, the MB started to face harsh restrictions and harassments
from the government as an opposition group therefore they diverted their focus on
syndicates (Fahmy, 1998). In 1984 to 1987 they wanted to control syndicates like
doctors, lawyers and engineers’ syndicate to strengthen their position in the political
scene and they achieved so by wining the majority of seats. Not only did the MB
members were controlling the doctors syndicate general assembly but also Engineers
Syndicate by wining 54 from 61 seats (Fahmy, 1998).
To gain the support and spread their objectives, the MB started to take over
spaces university campuses and social volunteer work that surpassed the work done
by the government. They had the ability to provide the needs of the society;
consequently, they gained an informal legitimacy and presences in backed from
society and started to move up (Al-Awadi, 2005). Moreover, personal interaction
between students on university campuses, during the mid 1980s, boosted the MB to
gain more popularity and strength as they are always trying to improve their student
services at a time the government failed to do such work (Al-Awadi, 2005). For
instance, MB members dominated the student union in Cairo and Alexandria
Universities; hence they started to give out revision sheets, papers, and selling used
textbooks. By the early 1990’s they controlled and had large representatives in most
associations as they used syndicates and student unions as alternative platforms to
express and reach people (Walsh, 2003).
The final approach was to show their good will and intention towards the
society through civil work in villages. For instance, they sent medical caravans, built
mosques in villages and places that the government didn’t reach. Therefore, they tried
to fill the gap between the government and people which gave them high popularity
and credibility (Walsh, 2003). Opposition groups stated that Islam would not cure
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societies, it is about the issues and problems like population growth, unemployment of
the educated, and shrinking of the middle class; as a result a group of factors creates
social crisis (Roy, 1994).
With such actions made towards society the organization framed itself
domestically as one that calls for true Islamic values. MB gained their legitimacy
from the society and the people, as the government didn’t officially approve their
presence in society (Al-Awadi, 2005). On the other hand, from outside countries and
international organizations would consider these “filling in the gap” as a way to
develop the Egyptian countryside (Walsh, 2003). Furthermore, many of the social
classes are trying to create an identity for itself by escaping from secularism and
adopting to Islamic principles. Islamic political movements, represented in parties,
think that by having an Islamic identity the needs of the society would be fulfilled
through Islam; however, what is needed is to make the right use of the sources
available in the society and not by changing the identity (Ayubi, 1980).
The MB took advantage of social events that affected the people and would
reach them with help and turn it to a political agenda for them. The 1992 earthquake
was a turning point for the MB as they were seen as a savior for the society since they
provided food, shelter and blankets to many homeless people who were affected from
the earthquake in Cairo. They appeared very efficient and organized and responded
faster than the government and as a result, the government seemed insufficient (Zahid,
2012). Not only did their quick reaction towards the crisis gave them social
recognition in Egypt but also global acknowledge. As a result of their total goodwill
intentions and work in the society, their social base expanded and Mubarak’s
government started to see them as threaten to the society (Walsh, 2003; Fahmy 1998).
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Their ultimate goal is to establish Muslim societies within Islamic states and
for him this starts by having a revolution on the tyrant authority (Moussali, 1992). Its
importance as Muslims started to lack knowledge, progress and the true essence of
Islam.
With the win of Islamic political parties, they have minor changes in the social
laws and customs. Their main concern would be reestablishing the Muslim law, the
Sharia, as the main primary source in society (Roy, 1994). These intentions made the
Egyptian government to always perceive them a threat to the internal and external
relations of the country.
During the 1990s, the Islamic parties won the elections in 1991, in Algeria and
transformed the country to a more conservative and Islamic country. The Egyptian
government feared the increasing growth of the MB. In 2000, the MB won 17 seats in
the People’s Assembly and five years later they won 20% of the seats in the
parliament as independent candidates (BBC, 2013). Consequently, the Egyptian
government started to limit their participation and movements within the society by
putting more security measures, arresting members, issuing legal laws and policies
that would obstacle and control their political participation (Kepel, 2005). In addition
to that, the government feared that they would control the social middle class, which
represents a large percentage form the society. Therefore, they were always faced by
harsh security measures and many of them were sent to jail for years without even
having a formal investigation or accusation. Furthermore, many Islamic militant were
considered as offspring from the MB as groups started to appear and establish
themselves and threaten the society through very violent actions (Ayubi, 1980).
Many extremists and radical Islamic groups went to Sinai to settle there by
early eighties and most of these groups and members are jihadist or Salafi and not
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linked with the MB (Mamdouh, 2012). Furthermore, most of jihadist groups, in North
Sinai, settled there as to be near to the Israeli boarders and be able to launch attacks
against them and also to establish an Islamic state in the peninsula (Shaaban, 2011).
For instance, “Al Tawhed and Jihad” group were responsible for bombings and
terrorist attacks on touristic attractions and compounds in Sinai from 2004 to 2006.
Moreover, the level of violence differs from each group depending on how they want
to achieve their goals ad objective. This is due to their background, education, and
socio economic class (Ayubi, 1980). The political system in Egypt bans any political
party to be based on religion or ethnicity. Yet the Brotherhood was always trying to
establish their political party. However, in parliamentary elections they were allowed
to enter as individuals or some used to merge with other political groups (Fuller,
2004). In the last two years, the MB, was surprised with the political performance of
the Salafi who just entered the real life of politics, and yet managed to win many seats
in the parliamentary elections, 25%, and expand their social base (Hassan, 2012).
B. Salafi Groups:
Salafism refers to “an interpretation of Islam that seeks to restore Islamic faith
and practice to the way they existed at the time of Muhammad” (Brown, 2011). Thus
Salafis, nowadays, believe that such a great time should be a Sharia example and
guide to live with and apply it in our societies. Islamic scholars traced roots of the
Salafism ideology to Ibn Taymiyya who wanted to focus on the time of the prophet
till the death of scholar Ibn Hanbil & the prophets companions as he thinks this was
the real and pure Islamic era and that we as people need to follow the rules, practices
and beliefs of this time (Gauvain, 2010). Moreover, Salafi theology is created from
such ideology to the Quran and Sunna as their core guide in life and in establishing
societies and that the individual should always depend on God. Importantly, salafi

15

ideology is governed by a more strict, and often literal, interpretation of the Islamic
textual sources. Some more extreme strands of salafism harshly denounce some who
are perceived by Salafis as not following properly the Qur’an and Sunnah.
The concept of Salafism entered through The Ansar al-Sunna (Helpers of the
Prophetic Way), started to establish itself in Egypt as the leading Salafi organization,
founded by Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqqi, 1924 (Gauvain, 2010). The organization
aimed for a religious reform in the Egyptian society through using meaning from the
Quran and the Prophet’s actions and life. Moreover, gaining help and support from
Saudi Arabia by sending scholars (Brown, 2011). Targeting lower and middle class
people in delta cities where it was easy for them to control their minds and many of
them were coming back from Saudi Arabia as workers were already exposed so such
religious views. For instance, sermons, lectures, and books were given to the public.
Where as in Upper Egypt “Al Gamaa Al Islamia” is more covered with Sunni beliefs
and is against the secular system in the country. Yet, both parties were always out of
politics and just focusing on a religious reform.
The MB and the Salafis share the same objectives and ideology but each group
achieves it in a different way (Rubin, 2011). Salafism deeply focuses on the way of
life and practices of prophet Mohamed and his companions and view this era as “pure
Islam” and therefore, they follow it (Durie, 2013). Both groups tend to use religious
terminologies and languages yet it is reflected in the Salafis dress wear that they do
not want to adapt to the western clothes. Generally speaking, the salafis are more
strict and literal in their interpretation of the Islamic texts and Islamic shari’ah, while
the Brotherhood are viewed as more moderate and flexible in their interpretations.
Their ideology is against any western political, economic, or social ideology
or principles to be applied or influenced in Islamic societies since they are not based
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on Islamic roots or not derived from the timing of Prophet Mohammed (Durie, 2013).
On the other hand, the MB tends to be more flexible in adapting ideologies form the
west that might fit the Islamic societies. The MB tend to challenge western ideologies
in many aspects like politics, economy, culture and social and try to use and adapt
them to the Egyptian society. In an interview (2011) with Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi,
on the MB English website, mentioned that the MB is more “comprehensive and
inclusive” as it includes all religious concepts like Sufi and Salafi. He also, mentioned
that the MB tries to be flexible and balanced in challenging issues, unlike the Salafis,
who tend to be aggressive and violent to some extent when they face western
concepts. Furthermore, al-Qaradawi stated that the Salafis view that the MB got
drifted from their main objective and core Islamic value. As a result, the US views
MB as a moderate Islamic organization and the Salafi as a radical group (Rubin,
2011).
Socially, Salafi concepts would use Islam in any mean to stop and fight
imperialism and western influence return to the Quran the Sunna and the sharia and
reject the 4 major Islamic schools, the Madhahib (Roy, 1994)
Although their main objective is to establish the Islamic Shari’aa as the
country guide, they started to participate and involve themselves in politics, especially
during the January 25th 2011 revolution (Brown, 2011). Many of the Salafis were
divided whether they should join the people’s protests against the ruler or not. This
division created a distraction to their followers and each person started to think
individually regarding their religious background. As they started to participate in
political events and appear more on TV channels and press Salafi leaders began to be
careful about their image and the messages they deliver via the media. For instance,
the Salfi channels such as Al Hafez, Al Rahma and Al Nas are all promoting for
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Salafi. Nowadays, 70% of mosques in Egypt are under the Salafism ideology
(Gauvain, 2010). As for women, they are not allowed to appear on the screens as
some consider it a sin to appear, talk, or interview a man she is not married to and this
reflects how the they have a rigid mentality towards women and gender relationships
(Field and Hamam, 2009).
Having explained the ideas of MB and Salafis idea and provided an overview
on their ideologies and history, I will look now on how Muslims are being pictured in
western media. Western countries and media are a part of the MB and Salafi audience
because they are being framed and portrayed in the west as anti democratic and
Muslim extremists; therefore, both groups appear to be trying to address them in their
websites content as a response to the stereotypes and labeling in western media.
C. Muslims in Western Media:
In this section I will present how are Muslims in western media portrayed.
Although this study is concerned with how Islamists portray themselves on their
websites, it is also important to examine, in the review of literature, studies that
analyze how Muslims and Islamists are portrayed in western media. The reason this is
relevant to the present research is because western media portrayals have, at least in
part, helped shape how many people inside Egypt perceive Islamists, and also because
Egyptian Islamist discourses can be seen partly as a response to common stereotypes
of Islamists, many of which are spread through western media representations.
In the West, Islam has been closely related with the word terrorism and terror
(Said, 1997). The labeling started by the Iranian hostage crisis to change the picture of
Islam in the west. Western media started to portray Muslims as terrorists and related
Islam to violence and aggressiveness (Mishra, 2008). Since then, Arabs & Muslim
been portrayed in a negative image in the West through media and films. This is due
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to some individuals been hijacking or bombing places in name of Islam (Nurullah,
2010). The media portrayed and related the word Muslims with global terror, jihad,
fundamentalism and radical groups (El-Aswad, 2013); consequently, western societies
started to create Islamophobia and distant themselves from Muslim societies and
viewed them as “the other” (Said, 1997). Furthermore, western media represents the
Muslims society as a dominant male environment and that women do not have a role
or a significant status in society and as a result, these ideologies “ hinder the
acceptance” of Muslim societies and make it more difficult to communicate (Navarro,
2010).
As a global media event, September 11 marked the beginning of an era of
unprecedented media focus and attention, both internationally and locally, on the
issue of Islam and relating it to terrorism (Aly, 2007).

Not only scholars and

academics wanted to deeply understand Islam and Muslims but also individuals.
Western and European governments view groups with Islamic roots, in Middle Esat,
as a threat to the political stability in societies and countries (Said, 1997).
Furthermore, it is been debated whether Islam is compatible with democracy and
supports the notion of freedom of expression in Arab societies (Mishra, 2008).
Muslim youths are taking many paths and it remains to be seen how they will
be trained, how they will interpret and practice their religion (Leonard, 2003). Using
the websites created they try to identify their values, ideology and have a correct
image for them. Currently, they are reconstructing their identity in ways that reinforce
religion as the primary marker of identity yet not labeling them as terrorists. Scholars
observed that the internet is a potential virtual world for Muslims as they discuss
political issues like freedom, democracy and human rights (El Masry, 2013).
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The public viral space afforded Muslims, everywhere, opportunities to engage
in alternative communicative and spaces that did not perpetuate negative stereotypes
of Muslims (Aly, 2007). El Aswad, 2013, states that due to the ignorance of media
about Islam and Muslims there is a conflict of ideology and vision. Although the
Internet remove boundaries between Muslims in the world there are still some ethical
and moral limits to them like online gambling and watching pornography sites (Bunt,
2009). Furthermore, contributions and efforts from Muslims can make better
understanding towards American society. Like, demonstrating the proper ways of
bringing up children and caring for the elderly, influences that involve conceptions of
gender, the individual’s morals and ethics (Leonard, 2003). All these actions are a true
reflection on the essence of Islam and helps in understanding the core values of
Muslims.
D. Islamists Portraying Themselves:
The Internet, as a transformative medium, has bridged geographical barriers
among many Muslims. The Internet technology has contributed to what can be
described as a “virtual online Islamic community” (El-Nawawy & Khamis, 2010). In
Middle East countries, due to the presence of authoritarian regimes, people are not
always given a chance to express their opinions or thoughts without fear (Khamis and
Vaughn, 2011). Yet, the internet provided a chance for expression to express views
and opinions (Tajbakhsh, 2003).
Websites have enabled Muslims to interact in online discussions and
deliberations, which can help in expressing and shaping Muslim personality (ElNawawy & Khamis, 2010). Many websites like Islam-online, and Ask Imam began
having sections to address Islamic topics such as marriage, fasting, pilgrimage and
Shari’aa (Islamic values) all these topics are written by Muslim scholars and
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academics. However, not all websites provided the author of the topic. Moreover, The
audiences are enthusiastic about such online fatwas, as they don’t get satisfactory
answers in real life and thus, they turn to the virtual Islamic world (Bunt, 2003). Due
to the poor quality of technological education in the Middle East, there is no focus on
online religious education or training, to create an online public space for discourse
about Islam (El-Nawawy & Khamis, 2010).
Getting exposed to such Islamic websites creates a certain framing and
perception in one’s mind. Since, many inquiries and expressions are prohibited and
censorship, these Islamic websites are turning to online Islamic society. In their article
Collective Identity In The Virtual Islamic Sphere, El-Nawawy and Khamis mention
that political issues like democracy, human rights, and freedom of expression are
discussed in many forums.
Not only Muslims but also non-Muslims can promote and share their own
point views and get exposed to many different perspectives (Bunt, 2009). Using tools
like chat rooms, forums, multimedia videos and images, social networks that are all
based on the user generate may help Muslims to discover new knowledge and details
about Islam. Thus, this virtual world created a new platform for Islam that is growing
globally with different perceptions and looks.
The role of websites is to unite people with same ideas and beliefs. Islamic
websites are a possible bridge between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, acting as alternate
voices online and simplifying the spread of democratization. In addition to that, they
are now serving as window for Islamic countries (Bunt, 2003). It helped in the
creation of “collectivism and communalism” as people with the same religious
identity and faith started to form their own online communities (El-Nawawy &
Khamis 2010). The virtual Islamic community discusses political, social and gender
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issues. One of most topics talked about is the Palestinian – Israeli conflict (Bunt,
2003). Due to its relation with Islam, this issue is debated on Muslim websites. Bunt
states that Islamic Militant groups in countries like Afghanistan, and Chechnya started
to use the word “e-jihad” on online groups and websites to foster their cause and
weakens their opponent’s ideology and supporters.
On the other hand, the Salafists are not wide spread on websites due to their
conservative and traditional philosophy. However, currently there are 12 stations that
provide Salafi content on Niles Sat, Egypt’s main satellite (Field & Hamam, 2009).
They focus on reading the Quran solely as their guidance in life but before following
it a Muslim must have proper beliefs; therefore, they try to correct other Muslims
beliefs. For example, Al Nass (The people) was one of these channels started to
broadcast in 2006. The channel started with non-religious programs or content but the
viewership wasn’t very high. Thus, the owner, Saudi investors, gave the chance for
some Salafi clerics to give talk shows to viewers and therefore, the viewership hugely
increased (Field and Hamam, 2009). After 9/11, a global shift happened to focus and
understand the whole Islamic community with its different types. Muslim websites
were highlighted and more websites tackling international relations were established
(Bunt, 2003).
To sum up, the political Islamic parties websites and Salafi stations create a
certain frame and image in the society’s mind. This reflects the content, ideologies
and visions on how the political Islamic parties members and Salafi perceive women,
violence and freedoms in society.
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III. Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework
A. Social Construction of Reality:
In this section, I will discuss the theoretical framework that will be used to
analyze the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi discourses. The theoretical perspective
that underlies this research is social construction of reality. Social realities are created
from individuals’ points of view and can be used to explain how the MB and Salafis
view and construct reality.
The theory is a subset of the sociology of knowledge – which is concerned
with how human thought is produced out of specific and contextualized social
circumstances (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Specifically, the social construction of
reality addresses how acquired knowledge about the world can help create a
perception of reality that can be taken to be “the environment itself” (Lippmann,
1922). Importantly, reality construction is based largely on discourses and language
(Turbbull, 2002). That is, people perceive reality through language, and end up
developing their concrete understandings about the world through the discursive
constructions they come across and interact with. Berger and Luckmann as cited in
"Using religious discourse to construct reality” mentioned that human beings are not
stable and need to create a meaning to the world they live in. People interact and
communicate in order to establish social values and norms (Lisa, 2007). In sum, then,
the social construction of reality deals with how individuals construct various views
of the world and reality (Waks, 1990).
Some scholars have written specifically about how people construct reality –
the very process of individual-level reality construction. Searle (1995) argues that
people construct social reality by assigning functions and names to objects according
to their purposes. Here, according to Searle (1995), words and symbols are important
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because they are partly constitutive in the reality of society. What is key, also, is that
the meanings that people have assigned to objects and events are often passed down,
taken for granted, and unquestioned. Schutz mentions that when an individual
believes in something as true or real, unconsciously he gives it status of reality and
cannot be turned into fantasy. However, reality should be considered unstable insofar
as people can alter their perceptions about objects and events (Pable, 2010).
In relation to the above, the study deals with Islamic groups establish political
parties, FJP & Al-Nour, that were formed based on sharing and intentionally believing
the same principles, values and attitudes. As these groups are formed, their members
develop collective behavior actions that create their social identity, and constructing a
reality form their view.
Den Bulck (1999) states that Le and Burger mention two types of reality:
objective and subjective reality. The objective reality is the world without individuals
but with governments, rules and regulations. The subjective social reality is the
individual living in the objective reality and trying to internalize it due to his living
conditions, perceptions and attitudes. Furthermore, subjective reality has to do with
attitudes and perspectives towards objects in the environment. These manners and
views are gained through everyday experience (Waks, 1990). Berger and Luckmann
(1966), however, state that there is no objective reality and that people living in
societies tend to internalize what they see in order to adapt to the environment.
Individuals are shaped by their own experiences. At the same time media pushes its’
own subjective reality (Den Bulck, 1999). The connection and the point of conflict
between the self and media is informative on how people create their views.
In their book, Berger & Luckmann (1966) say that experience and knowledge
that an individual gains form the society, helps and directs the human to view the
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world in a particular way. Therefore, a "relative-natural world view" is created within
the individual and people accept that reality exists and don’t question or doubt its
presence because it is taken for granted and real.
As social reality is being established within individuals they also develop their
own identities and relations with one another. Individual identities are created and can
be reshaped or modified depending on the social relations of the person. People who
have the same identity qualities tend to socialize together and get closer in groups
together, forming a certain structure or category in the society. Moreover, identities
are social products that established by time and history depending on elements that
one is exposed to. As people who live in the same society or social group and context
share the same common sense, as there is similarity between their actions. Thus,
common sense knowledge is created by our daily routine in the everyday (Berger &
Luckmann, 1966).
Similarly the MB members create their own social identity, community. From
their origin, they base their structure on shared values and beliefs, and turn it to their
identity which is having a state governed and headed by Islamic values. The social
identity of the MB is the most significant and plays a crucial role in the development
of its’ group identity. It is the core of the MB as potential and new members joining
them had to not only share and belief but also help in wide spreading the principles of
Islamic values in society. As a result, the members and followers create their own
views on reality.
Gotved, 2006, states that Boudreau and Newman highlight the importance and
role of social interaction in constructing reality and structuring the society. For them,
social reality includes values, meanings and cultural practices that are determined by
social communication. Moreover, Knowledge that an individual gains is through
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social interactions in communities as the theory evolves on how social relations are
created and its experience is gained (Turbbull, 2002).
As individuals live in the same community and socially interact and
communicate with each other, their behavior and attitude begins to be affected by one
another. Collective behavior is where people share the same desire, beliefs and
intentions and cooperate together to achieve something (Kind, 2001). Like the
Furthermore, in doing collective intentionality actions the person is part of something
and his actions and intentions must engage with the rest of the group.
The MB formed their environment within the Egyptian society. Their projects
should be in partnership with other MB members as they built malls, clothes shops to
buy from, and food and beverage chains (Daragahi, 2013). Furthermore, kids are sent
to Islamic schools in order to focus on their religious and Islamic teachings like Quran
and Shariaa. Most of these business venues are open for the whole society but owned
and managed by MB businessmen that serve its members.
As social identity is being created and reality is constructed, this results in the
appearance of social structure. When patterns of social reality are combined they form
social structure depending on groups, organizations and communities deal with each
other (Gotved, 2006). On the other hand, online communication gives a chance to
reality to be shaped due to many factors like design, organization, networks and
subliminal ideologies one exposed too. As MB members interact and communicate
with other individuals in society through work and socialization both sides try to
influence, intentionally or unintentionally, each other by their attitude and behavior.
Yet, it is difficult to extract them from such structured organization and letdown their
identity.
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Not only does the MB members create their reality but also the Salafis with
their individual experience, perceptions about the society. An individual pictures
reality in his own way and creates a certain image inside him mind, that’s similar to
the real world. Yet, this image is true or correct according to the environment and
groups that the individual is living in (Bulck, 1999). The Salafis picture the current
society as sinful environment and lacks Islamic values and rules and due to this there
is unemployment, crime and bribes in society are wide spreading. This perceived
reality inside their minds due to their belief that people should live and abide by
Islamic values and rules similar to the time of the prophet. Consequently, followers of
the Salafis share and have the same intention to spread the principles of Salafism.
This action of members within its’ party can be labeled as collective behavior.
An important aspect in forming the social reality is language. Language
contains symbols, words that represent, or symbolize or mean a thought. We name
animals, objects according to a systematic and linguistic system that is socially
accepted. Language, knowledge and reality are contingent depending on a persons
experience and views (Pable, 2010).
Language fills our lives with meaningful objects as meanings are assigned to
them. Moreover, systems are established through collective agreement and constituted
by thoughts by individuals living in the same place (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). In
addition to that, constructing this reality language plays an important role as it helps
in describing, defying and explaining objectives around us in the society. Moreover,
interacting with social members in the same language and meaning creates social
identity that builds reality (Lisa, 2007).
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B. Research Questions:
To sum up, there are two main research questions, stated below, that I will
analyze.
1. What discourses do the FJP and Al-Nour parties use to describe themselves and their
agendas on their websites?
a. How they are similar and different from one another?
b. What do the groups claim to offer Egyptian society?
2. What discourses do the groups employ to address long-held stereotypes against them
dealing with backwardness, violence, and particularly exclusion of non-Muslims?
Finally, this study should bring to society a better understanding on their philosophy
and highlight the difference between the MB & Salafi and not to be biased to any of
them.
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IV. Chapter Four: Methodology
A. Discourse Analysis:
As mentioned earlier, this thesis deals with Islamic parties’ websites and how
they present their ideologies and philosophy to the Egyptian society. This research
will employ discourse analysis. In choosing the sample of the websites, I chose the
most powerful Islamic groups and parties in Egypt. The FJP was ruling Egypt for a
year, before the military intervention, and was gaining popularity and political
acquisition. Al-Nour party, which emerged as the second most popular Islamist party,
took 25% of parliamentary seats (Kirkpatrick, 2011).
After the Jan. 25th revolution, the Supreme Military Council, that was ruling
the country at the time, issued a several decree with adjustments and provisions on
March 23rd 2011 easing the process of establishing political parties. The adjustments
made it easy to both Islamic groups to establish the parties by just informing the
committee and 5000 founding member to establish a party. For the MB and Salafi
group such step was achievable due to their wide spread of social base; consequently,
44 new political party were established including the FJP and Al-Nour (Mohamed,
2013).
The MB established their political party in 2011, and rapidly opened offices
supported and funded by the MB members all over Egypt. At the time of this writing,
they have one electronic website in English (http://www.fjponline.com). In apersonal
interview with Moataz Abdel Hady, Journalist at Al Masry Al youm, said that as the
Arabic FJP website is closed down by the Ministry of Interior as the website was
criticizing the government (Personal interview, 2013). It was my original intention to
analyze the Arabic sections of the FJP website because it communicates to the
Egyptian people and society in their local language. But I was forced to rely the on
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English website as the Arabic is shutdown. On the other hand, the Salafis also
established their political arm, Al-Nour party, in 2011, and have an Arabic language
website, (http://www.alnourparty.org). This is their official platform to reach people. I
decided to focus on the FJP and Al-Nour websites because these are most two
significant Islamic groups who established political parties. Also, they won the
majority of seats in the last parliamentary elections, 2011, and their social base is
expanding.
Accordingly, in this study I will analyze the section “About us” on both
websites as it shows and explains to the reader the identity and how the parties
introduce themselves. In addition to that, I will analyze the FJP “Program on
Freedoms and Political Reform” under the Party Platform 2011 section and the
“Political Program” on Al-Nour Website. Also, sections on “ Programs on Religious
Leadership” on the FJP and “ Culture & Identity” on Al-Nour website will be
examined to explore the party’s ideologies and perspectives regarding social, political
and cultural issues.
The researcher will be using discourse analysis, a qualitative method, in
understanding and analyzing the websites. As Fair (1996) states, discourse analysis is
“ an approach that allows for the interpretation of texts in relation to the cultural
contexts in which they operate”.
The usage of discourse analysis is very suitable for such a research and timing,
as it will help in analyzing vision, ideologies on their websites and relating it with
their action in the society. I will focus on the content of the sections and how they are
written in regards to word choice, structure and look. Also, analyzing the meaning of
the texts, headlines and relating them to the social context. The importance of using
such a methodology is to help in getting a wider understanding as the analysis will be
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linked to real life. Therefore, such a methodology develops our understanding for
social actions and structure and helps in understanding meaning and patterns of
relationships with society (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak& Vetter, 2000). The media
messages are not a single-minded message but rather a carrier of many messages that
is targeted to different audiences and segments and depending on the reader
interaction with the text, the meaning is formed. Not only discourse analysis focuses
on linguistics elements but also on ideological and political aspects inside the message
(Jensen & Jankowski, 1991).
Discourse analysis does not only focus on language or words but also the
knowledge of the people of the language and how they use it with their backgrounds,
feelings, memories and anything they have written, hear or said it; therefore, it’s
named discourse analysis, not language analysis (Johnstone 2002). Yet, language is a
very crucial form of social practice as its helps in supporting and building social
relations, social identities and creating beliefs and knowledge. Therefore, discourse
analysis emphasis on the analysis between the relationship of language and wider
scale of social and cultural construction (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak& Vetter, 2000).
Discourse analysis helps in “examining aspects of the structure and function of
language in use” (Phillips & Jorgensen, Pg. 65, 2002). Usually analysts tend to
breakdown long discourses and start to examine each discourse thoroughly on its’
own. This division can be made when new topic is introduced, the subject is changed
or a new paragraph will start as it shed the light on how meanings can be reflected
through the arrangement of sentences after each other (Johnstone, 2002).
Moreover, discourse analysis is very multifaceted method, as it doesn’t only
analyze text, structure and message, but it relates it to social, political and cultural
aspects happening within the context (Jensen & Jankowski – 1991). Therefore, the
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analysis will always be linking both the message and what’s happening in real life.
The analysis “implies a systematic relationship between the text and social conditions,
ideologies and power-relations” (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak& Vetter, 2000). In other
words, discourses are formed due to social events, incident and principles and
consequently the society is structured. Discourses are wider than texts, therefore
researchers focuses on them to analyze and not the language of the text.
B. Importance of Language:
With language we construct a reality that didn’t exist. Language is not just a
mean to describe, explain, talk or transfer information and knowledge it’s a system
that constructs social reality and people relate their feeling, emotions and memories,
discourses, with the language (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002). It can be used to know the
role of human in social life. Also, helps to understand why a writer used such word
choice or sentence arrangement. Furthermore, it illustrates why people tend to have
conversations or have an argument. Also, it explains social relationships and
individual identity as it explores the background, memories and experience of human
individuals (Johnstone, 2002).
People tend to use language to make sense of their action and explain them to
others. Yet, each individual has his own surroundings, with its’ different views and
importance (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002). People all over the world connect meanings
to sounds they hear depending on each social identity and relation with society.
Therefore, the construction of social discourses differs in meanings and
communication from one place to another.
C. Protocols:
This research is guided by the broad question of how Islamic groups present
their ideologies and principles to the Egyptian society through political websites. As
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mentioned earlier, I will focus on the about us sections, political and religious
leadership, identity and culture section on both websites. I will focus specifically on
how the sections discuss three important aspects of political Islamic identity: the
religious other, freedom of expression and terrorism. Ways of categorizing, images,
sources, supporting evidence and headlines will be analyzed and noted. The research
will examine how, website’s content, in the context of thinking of social groups or
individuals. For instance, how both parties state they will face terrorism and return of
safety in the city.
Sections on freedom and political reform programs on the FJP website are
selected in order to discover the freedom of expression and how Islamists view it as
there are many stereotypes challenging both parties. A textual discourse analysis is
done to understand and show the ideological beliefs of their party’s perspectives. In
addition to that, the religious leadership and culture and identity section is studied to
determine how both parties position Al-Azhar, Copts and the Egyptian Church as
these are the most significant issues present on the political scene. Also, the Islamic
political parties are faced with stereotypes and accusations as being against Copts and
the church; therefore, the examining and highlighting of these points will allow the
reader to understand the FJP and Al-Nour ideology towards Al-Azhar the church
relationship. Furthermore, this section would identify their religious vision and how
they use religion in society. Analysis, also on how Copts are described, explained and
positioned in text will provide an understanding and illustrate their views in order to
face any claims targeted to any of the parties. The analysis does not show the literal
meaning but rather tries to place it in an informative social framework that would help
in understanding the parties’ stand and vision.
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This research is not to solely conduct language and textual analysis but rather
to relate the context with the social and cultural life. Also, it is not intended to show
or expose any lies and misleading information from both websites. The aim of the
research is “through assimilation” of broad social, political, cultural and language
stated on selected sections is to understand and how the Islamic parties introduce
themselves.
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IV. Chapter Five: Analysis
As mentioned earlier, I will focus on “About us” on both websites as it shows
and explains to the reader the identity and how the parties introduce themselves. In
addition to that, I will analyze the FJP “Program on Freedoms and Political Reform”
under the Party Platform 2011 section and the “ Political Program” on Al-Nour
Website. Also, sections on “ Programs on Religious Leadership” on the FJP and “
Culture & Identity” on Al-Nour website will be analyzed.
A. Freedom and Justice Party “About Us”:
The section “About us” appears on the upper left of the homepage. The
webpage opens with the logo of the party at the top center of the page and beneath it a
large headline in red and underlined saying “ The Founding Statement of the Freedom
and Justice Party”. This section consists of ten paragraphs with no visuals, media or
external links.
The first paragraph starts with “in the spirit of the January 25 Revolution
made by the great Egyptian people and guarded by the courageous Egyptian army”
showing and highlighting the importance of the revolution, Egyptian society as a
whole and the role of army. The significance of starting with such statement is to
show their support to the revolution and paying respect to the Egyptian people who
participated in the revolution. Also, the party is trying to identify themselves as
revolutionaries and to try and change the stereotypes in people’s mind as some
political parties accused them of not participating in the January 25th revolution from
day one, or of hijacking the revolution. For example, some liberal revolutionaries
accused the MB of participating in the revolution only when the protests and
demonstrations reached their peek, and also of making deals with the Mubarak regime
and the military afterwards (Hassan, 2012). Therefore, by drawing attention to the
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revolution with a type of revolution discourse, the MB are seeking to combat these
claims. Also, stating their main principles in building Egypt and defining the Egyptian
citizen reflecting the party’s vision on citizenship.
In the second paragraph the MB mentions how they plan to be build and form
the country, integrating all governmental and non-governmental institutions like “
civil society, trade unions, public groups, associations and human rights”. It can be
understood here that the FJP is trying to show their willingness to cooperate with all
institutions in society as to face claims mentioned after the revolution that they will
manipulate the social, political, and economic scenes if and when they come to power.
Furthermore, the party is attempting to focus more on non-political groups and
institutions, as they didn’t mention religious, educational institutions like Al-Azhar,
the Coptic Church, or student unions.
After the revolution and the MB winning the majority of parliament seats,
some opinion leaders, and political figures were claiming the FJP would work on a
constitution that would fit their objective of establishing an Islamic, and conservative
state. Therefore, in the third paragraph, the party appears to be trying to respond to
these claims by stating how the constitution should be and the individual’s rights to
have in order to achieve equality, social justice and freedom in society. They state, “
through this Constitution - freedom and dignity for the nation, affirming the
sovereignty of the people and national unity. It should be a constitution that supports
the equality of all people in all rights and duties, adhering to respect for pluralism and
diversity, emphasizing the devolution of power and freedom of political parties,
ensuring freedom of information and expression, freedom of belief ”.
The fourth paragraph highlights the constitution should be based on Islam and
state “as a response to the demands of the majority of the Egyptian people who

36

believe that the Sharia is the best method to ensure the reformation”. Its significance
is that the party is trying to showing that they are demanding the people’s demand and
not the FJP objective as to defy allegations in the media of trying to work on a
constitution to fit their purposes. Moreover, they mentioned Sharia would be the
source of rights, freedoms, beliefs and worship of Christians. In this statement the
party appears to be trying to give themselves more credibility in the eye of others and
also assure Christians to feel safe within the society.
After the MB emerged on the political scene and established the FJP, there
were claims by some countries that they wouldn’t consider any political agreements
or peace treaties with other countries especially with the claim of entering a state of
war with Israel to free Palestine (Glain, 2012; Pfeiffer, 2012); therefore, in the fifth
paragraph, they mention that the party respects the external relations with foreign and
Arab countries. Also, respects international and peace treaties with other countries. Its
importance is to clarify to the west and European countries that the party is trying to
show their willingness and keen to have peaceful relations with the world and not to
enter in a state of war.
The sixth paragraph discusses political stability and economic growth and
justice among society will help in maintaining the national security in Egypt. Also,
the need to develop, invest and reconstruct in Sinai. Furthermore, building new
relations with Nile basin countries and maintaining Egypt’s relation with them. The
party appears to be trying to clarify the importance of such reconstruction and
investment and might lead to more independent economy from the west, more
employment for youth, new cities would be built, decrease the imports, and building
industrial areas.
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The following paragraph focuses on two points: the first is the support of the
Egyptians to the military and army and having industries to provide them with their
needs. It is very crucial that they mention “Party also believes in acting for the
development of the basic strategic industries as a base for our military industries”.
This implies that the MB are trying to create a new and fresh relation with the army
and showing them that they will back and help them. The party’s choice in the words
“basic strategic industries” appears to that the party is trying to financially fund the
army industries of weapons, and vehicles. The second point is, FJP, to focus on
education and scientific research, as it’s the nation’s way to develop. The party was
plagued by claims (by its opposition) that they would not focus on education or
research, and that many MB members are illiterate and ignorant and others didn’t
continue their university degrees. Therefore, there is a stereotype that the MB and FJP
might not focus on the educational elements; however, here, they seem to respond
directly to these allegations with such statements “ We believe that education and
scientific research are the tools of progress, development and promotion” and that
“nation must put the issue of education and scientific research at the forefront of its
national priorities”. With the mention of these details, it appears that the party is
trying to change the stereotypes by showing their support to education and scientific
research and highlighting it is the nation’s way to develop.
The Eighth paragraph emphasizes enhancing and improving the police force
and police academy curriculum and to study human rights and respect for law.
Moreover, the FJP mention they would raise police officer salaries as to provide them
with a dignified life. The MB was thought to have hatred towards police, as they have
been illegal for more than 30 years and faced police brutality, violence and
oppression. It was thought by some that the FJP would want retribution; however, the
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party appears to be trying to enhance and develop the police forces performance and
create a new relation with them. The importance of introducing human rights
curriculum specifically deals with an ongoing issue of police brutality and violence
towards the society; as a result, the FJP wants to develop the police philosophy and
way of dealing with civilians to be peaceful and civilized. This approach – mentioning
police benefits and dignity, and also discussing police brutality – seems to represent a
balanced attempt to try and appease diverse segments. The MB is trying to appease
the police, on the one hand, but also Egypt’s revolutionaries, on the other. This can be
seen as a questionable strategy, since it is likely, or at least possible, that both the
police and many liberal revolutionaries would find this section problematic (albeit for
different reasons).
The ninth paragraph is divided almost equally. The first couple of sentences
are about the importance of Al-Azhar and its crucial role in Egypt and Muslim world.
The second is the respect of the party towards Orthodox Church as it teaches
Christians in African countries. It is very essential that the party mentioned Al-Azhar
and its role as the FJP is trying to appear that they do not to take over the role of AlAzhar as an Islamic institution and its’ position in the society. It is significant that
they stated so as there were claims that the MB wants to replace or position itself with
Al-Azhar and promote Sharia and Islamic principles. Furthermore, mentioning the
Orthodox Church and Christians in African countries implies that the party is trying to
gain support from different audiences and even try to communicate with new sects
that were neglected before. Its’ significance is showing that the FJP is trying to reach
to diverse sects of religion not only in Egypt but also Africa.
Finally, the last paragraph the party addresses all political parties and forces to
join them and agree on their basic principles in order to develop and enrich the
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country. The party is trying to promote unity, built relations and frame itself to a
diverse audience like non-Islamists, Salafi, Christians, Copts, West and EU countries
that are dealing with for the first time.
To sum up, not only the FJP is trying to introduce their political vision and
philosophy to the Egyptian society but also to the western governments and countries.
Statements are written in different formats and structure in order to reach to all
different audiences reading the section. Since the MB have been working as an
underground organization for over 80 years so they had to introduce themselves for
the whole world especially with the raising fears of Islamists ruling Egypt.
B. FJP 2011 Program on Freedoms and Political Reform:
This webpage is linked from the homepage, under the Party Platform 2011
section. The analysis in this section will be on “ Program on Freedoms and Political
Reform”. The page starts with six lines summarizing the whole program mainly
saying that people should be granted their rights and freedoms in order to have a
democratic life and political system. Next to this abstract there is an image of people
marching in Tahrir Square holding paper signs saying, “go away Mubarak” during the
Jan. 25th revolution. The image indicates that the party was against Mubarak regime
dictatorship and with the revolution. Also, there is a button to share the page on many
social media networks, emails, adding it to favorites, or print it. Under the share
button, written “ Sunday, December 4, 2011 17:01” showing the date and time of the
post.
Then the program starts by having a bold headline “FJP 2011 Program on
Freedoms and Political Reform”. A brief introduction that Egyptians should be
granted freedoms and rights and a democratic environment would lead to the
circulation of power and stability of the society. Also, the party states that a new
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constitution is needed based on Sharia principles to achieve an Islamic state. The
introduction is ended by a quote from Omar “When did you enslave people who were
born free?” to appear that the party is supporting freedoms of expression and that
individuals should have their rights.
The next part is stating the principles and concepts to reform the political life
in the country. They start with a bold black headline “Our political reform program is
based on the following principles and concepts”. They mention three main concepts:
characteristics of the state, the nature of the political system and the fundamental
political principles espoused in the program.
The paragraph on the characteristics of the state highlights the FJP demand to
achieve and state “national constitutional Islamic modern democratic state based on
sharia as it regulates aspects of individuals life in worship, mortality and also
guarantees the rights and protection of non-Muslims”. The word choice of the first
sentence is very crucial as the party is introducing their vision and idea on building
the new Egypt. This challenges the stereotypes facing them as people were anxious
that the MB would have an Islamic conservative closed society on individuals and
oblige women to wear niqab, separate women and men in public areas and close
public beaches. Thus, the party used the word “modern” as to defy these claims.
They move on to mention four main characteristics for the state they seek.
The first characteristic is the state based on equality in opportunities, duties and rights
between all citizens without discrimination because of religion or race. This statement
reflects the party’s attempt to balance equality and fairness between Muslims,
Christians and other sects in society. Though it can be related that during the 1990s
Islamic groups targeted Copts and churches in rural villages and many were killed
(Brownlee, 2013). Also, the FJP mentions that citizens will be hired in governmental
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positions based on their eligibility and competence. The party is trying to appear as
objective and equal in job opportunities and that everyone in society has a chance to
be hired in governmental posts. The second is the state based on a constitution as it
protects and supports the laws in society. The party is attempting to declare that they
do not want to gain power but rather enhance the value and morals of individuals
within the society through respecting the constitution and laws. Furthermore,
highlighting the Supreme Constitutional Court role in overviewing the legislation
process. Such concept appears to proclaim the party’s respect and objectivity in
establishing process and they would not interfere. Thirdly, the state is democratic and
based on Shura principles that the party believes is an essential foundation for all state
institutions. This point is crucial as it identifies the party’s method and way in taking
decisions. Forming Shura council with different people and political backgrounds
appears to explain that the FJP will not monopolize the political scene and take
decisions for their own good. This point encounters claims towards the MB of
dominating the political scene, as they are the biggest political party. The FJP states in
the fourth and final point to have a civilian state and an Islamic state is civilian by its’
nature. Moreover, it is not a military, police state, ruled by a dictatorship or armed
forced that get in power by military groups. Also, it’s the nation’s right to question,
dismiss and replace rulers. The party clearly states it is against any military coup and
a civilian in a democratic state should rule the state.
In their second concept to reform the political system, the FJP states the
parliamentary system on the long term while for this transitional phase is the
Parliamentary Presidential system.
The third and final principle is stating the fundamental political principles in
the programs. The FJP state seven principles: The principles of liberty, equality and
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equal opportunities, written in black bold headline, deals mainly with Sharia as a
source of freedom to all Egyptians and that it guarantees their rights. The party in this
statement the party is trying to reveal that all Sharia will be the only source of
freedoms to individuals and society and that none of the political parties or
governments will be involved in determining in order to avoid monopolizing and
subjectivity. Furthermore, they focus in this paragraph on “freedom of opinion and
expression, the formation of political parties and NGOs, meeting and demonstration”.
Also, highlight the banning of favoritism and creating equal opportunities for the
people. Furthermore, guaranteeing that women have their full rights and consistent
with Islamic values. The significance of this part is defying all stereotypes against the
MB as media and many opinion leaders mentioned that they do not support freedom
of expression, or opinion, demonstrations and that many sects of the society were
worried that the MB era would be similar as before. However, the party is appears to
be trying and remove these claims by clearly stating that they do not back any form
oppression and demand for transparent elections from all sects of society like
students, labors and professionals.
In the following part, the party clearly states their methods on how to achieve
a social justice within society for all sects. The independence of the judiciary
highlights the importance of jury and how it’s “the safety valve of society and the way
to achieve justice, safeguard rights, and attain security and stability”. The party
mentions that the Supreme Judicial Council should be tasked by with all jurisdiction
affairs. Also, have their own budget separated from the Ministry of affairs and most
notably remove the president as the head of the council. It is very significant that they
want the president not to hold power in the council as to appear objective as much as
possible. Furthermore, they did not mention that the FJP, or any governmental, non-
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governmental organization, political parties, figures or even the president will appoint
the head of the council and he will be selected by seniority. Such statement appears to
give the society an idea on how the party will rule and they are trying not to interfere
in judicial issues in order have a transparent, fair and well balanced juries and society.
Also, judges would not be sent on assignments to other ministries or any executive
branches in the government. Moreover, increasing the number of judges and cases
would be taken chronologically and finally, the judge’s club is the official entity for
them and no on has power over it except the general assembly and should have a
budget within the Supreme Council budget. With the mention of these points, the FJP
appears to be recognizing their respect towards the jury and judges and their role in
the society.
One of the most important aspects mentioned in the political reform, by FJP, is
the safeguarding citizenship rights, and revitalizing the role of individuals. This part
explains the party’s vision in defining citizenship and the state’s relation with
Christians. This paragraph is written in bulleted format of six points. It starts with
highlighting that Christians are part of the society and have equal rights and duties
towards the country and remove any injustice imposed on them and that Sharia
assures the Christians rights in living. They also mention their right to built churches
and pledge to quickly solve the problems of unauthorized churches. Furthermore, this
section emphasizes the relation between Muslims and Christians and how both are
one hand in building and developing society and the country’s civilization. The
significance of this part is the FJP appears to be trying to frame itself as a centrist
party and not a hardline Islamic party that is disputing and challenging “the other”. It
also, shows respect to the existence of the Christians within the Egyptian society and
living with Muslims and there presence is much needed to develop the country.
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Although these statements attempt to reveal how the MB view Christians and Copts
and challenges media stereotypes that the FJP are burning churches and will not allow
building of new churches, 100,000 Copts left Egypt to migrate to the US after the MB
came to power according to Dennis Ross of the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy (Adel, 2013). Thus, the party appears as wanting to create a secured society to
Christians to live and worship in. Also, FJP are trying to prevent themselves from
being criticized in dealing with Copts and Christians.
Finally the last concept in reforming process is revitalizing the role of civil
society by forming new unions for disadvantaged groups like the imams and
preachers. Creating a new law for trade between unions to have separate and own
entity without the interference of any political or ruling parties. Furthermore,
regulating the external funding for NGOs and supporting the union’s representatives
in giving their advice. The party in this section is trying to show their support for the
unions in building the society. Although the party only mentioned the imams and
preachers as the disadvantaged groups, it appears to be trying to reach and support all
different work forces through their unions.
C. FJP 2011 Program on Religious Leadership
Similar to the above, this page is linked to the Party Platform 2011 section on
the homepage. The “Program on Religious Leadership” page opens with medium
sized image focusing on two hands each holding the Quran and the cross. It’s very
significant to use such an image on the opening page as the party is appears to be
trying to transfer the message of unity and harmony between Muslims and Christians.
Next to it is the title “FJP 2011 Program on Religious Leadership” and beneath it few
lines describing the program. As the previous page, this page has links to many social
networking sites, email, print or post on a blog. Before starting the program they
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mention date and time, Sunday, December 4,2011 15:49, in order to document their
program.
They start the program by stating the headline again in bold font and beneath it
a paragraph focusing about how Egypt is a religious country and “Islam is the
supreme authority and fundamental framework” for Egyptians. However, they didn’t
mention any ways in dealing with Christians or any other sect, or the church. The
program is divided to three sections: the venerable Al-Azhar University and Mosque,
endowments and Egyptian Church.
In the first part the party offers means to help Al-Azhar to restore its local and
Global reputation and position. They start with the restructure the Islamic Research
Academy, and members would be elected and the Grand Imam would be elected from
its’ members. Also, getting the mosque and university to be independent financially
and administratively. This idea appears to reflect the transparency that the party is
trying to achieve and that no interference political or ruling party would appoint this
position. Furthermore, the FJP states “revitalize Al-Azhar’s role in Dawah outreach
abroad, clarify the image of Islam as the religion of mercy, peace, cooperation and
human dignity abroad.” Its crucial to notice the word of choice used in addressing the
international audience, as there have been many stereotypes and framing for Islam
and Muslims as being aggressive, violent and intolerant. Therefore, the party appears
to be trying such messages oriented towards the West and Europe in order to change
their views and perspectives on Islam. Finally, they state in order to revive Al-Azhar
role there should be a syndicate for imams and preachers like doctors and engineers.
In this statement the party is trying to highlight the importance of imams and
preachers to the society as they teach, promote and aware the essence of Islam to
Egyptians; consequently they need to get medical, social and cultural benefits in order
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to be well positioned in society. Also, establishing a union for them will restrict the
freelance work and will require getting permission from the union; as a result, it can
be understood that the degree of sermons and lectures will be more credible,
informative and educative.
In the second section the party believes in Waqf (endowment) as a way in
developing and reforming society. Therefore, they urge the independence of the Waqf
Authority and separate it from executive authority. They also, try to encourage private
sectors for Waqf projects that would be tax-free. The party proposes “vital areas,
including education, fighting poverty, unemployment and illiteracy, helping youths
get married, training of rural women” to have Waqf as a way to develop and enhance
their social status. The significance of mentioning such concept is that the FJP appears
to create unity and cohesion between sects of society. Also, Waqf will help in creating
job opportunities, economic stability, and social justice. The final section is the
Egyptian church and its’ importance in society. Furthermore, the party states that it’s
important to the church to have relations with all governmental and Islamic
institutions and Al-Azhar. Also, the party will support the church in leading the
Christian of the east. As an Islamist party, it appears that they are trying to affirm the
readers they will have close relations with the church and create unity among
Muslims and Christians. The party also attempts to remove any concerns from the
Christians towards the MB community and how they will deal with them in order to
make them feel secure.
To sum up, the previous overview on sections allowed us to understand the
FJP ideology and religious vision and how they want to frame their party to the
Egyptian society and West. Furthermore, they proclaim to appear as anti bigotry party
that seeks reconciliation and understanding between different religions and sects of
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society. Yet, it might be understood or believed by some people that the FJP focus on
sharia as a way to suggest that they want to build an Islamic Caliphate in the region.
Also, political differences in real life showed more flexibility in the MB than the
Salafi groups as the MB accepted the idea of have women and Christian in serving
state high-official positions (Hassan, 2012).
D. Al-Nour Party “About Us”:
In the following part, I will be analyzing Al-Nour sections: About Us, Political
Program and Culture and Identity Program.
The tab for this section is located in the middle front of the homepage. The
section introduces the party to the readers and targeted audience. Unlike the FJP
section, this part is very small in terms of paragraphs and content. The web page only
consists of two paragraphs and a title “who we are” in blue font on the upper right of
the page. Beneath it there are three buttons: to like on Facebook, post on twitter or to
share on any other social network.
They start to introduce themselves as “Men and women, youth and girls
vowed to renew and reform the society gradually” the word choice is the influence of
word choice in the beginning describes the responsibility and the hard work they are
willing to do for the society. They mention their development and work progress will
work under the slogan “Will only reform what I can”. The slogan is written in red as
standout and eye catch the reader’s attention. They all also mention their willingness
to build a modern Egyptian society to become a beacon to the world. It’s crucial that
they stated so to show the society they won’t only use Islamic principles but also
modern means in order to challenge the stereotypes facing them as Islamist
fundamentalists. However, they didn’t mention any points regarding Jan 25th
revolution, students, Christians, Coptic Church, Al Azhar, constitution, freedoms of
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expression, or the army. Although they are considered from the main political parties,
they provide a very brief introduction on their vision and ideology, unlike the FJP
were they provide the reader with a detailed and oriented issues.
The second paragraph states that the party includes members from all
segments and layers of society to rise with the society. The party will also use Islamic
Sharia in achieving justice and takes full responsibility in taking care of all
individuals living. Similarly to the FJP website, Al-Nour also stated that Sharia will
be their main source in guiding the country but the MB political party illustrated and
clarified much more as the reader can understand.
E. Al-Nour Political Program:
This section is linked to the Party’s program tab on the homepage. It starts by
a brief paragraph about the party’s vision to reform the political life in Egypt. They
state that political reform became a demand of the people from all segments and they
want to establish a modern state where people can live in peace. Also, they believe
that the state should be based on several institutions and decentralized. They highlight
the separation of legislative, judiciary, and executive authority to work in balanced
life. Its significant that the party stated their vision in decentralizing and separation
governmental institutions as it reflects modern way of thinking and distribute
authority and not to handle it one institution. Below this paragraph are three main
headlines all written in blue font: importance of saving rights and freedoms,
independence of the judiciary from the executive authority and respecting the
people’s choice.
In the importance of saving rights and freedoms they mention, “One of the
main reasons of the Jan revolution is deprivation of rights and freedoms”. It’s
important that Al-Nour state the January revolution as their first point as they are
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showing the society its importance to them and how they view it and that they are not
an extremist Islamist party. Similarly to the FJP, they back freedoms and rights
should be within the framework of Sharia. Its’ importance Al-Nour party are
explaining to the people that they wont be establishing and forcing laws to society as
it was claimed by media; however, they will use Sharia as their source which creates
credibility and confidence for the society. Moreover, they mention freedom of
expression, freedom of media, publication, establishing NGOs, publishing newspapers
and not to be administratively suspended. Such statements appear to clarify the
party’s perspective on freedoms and challenge the stereotypes appearing in society.
They move on to mention society has the right to choose his ruler and
represent him and to choose and participate politically, economically, culturally, and
social through representative institutions that are hold liability and transparency. The
party is trying to acknowledge the importance the representatives and their role in
developing the community and not only using Islamists as it was claimed.
The party also, state the society has the right to express its diverse choices,
protect itself against oppression and tyranny, protect human dignity for individuals,
free education for all basic stages of education, affordable housing. In addition to that,
there should be economic competition in the market that is free, transparent and
doesn’t harm the society. Al-Nour appears to be trying to reveal the importance of
building better economy, work opportunities and a market that not monopolized by
businessmen or companies working for their own sake.
In the above part, Al-Nour did not define society and always mention
statements in plural and being vague without specifying a certain segment or group in
society. Thus, the party appears to be trying to target all rights and freedoms to all
segments, Muslims, Copts men and women. Moreover, they distinct themselves from
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the FJP by giving more focus and attention on education and addressing the youth as
it can be understood they are the future and want to invest in them by involving them
in the political system.
The second headline is independence of the judiciary from the executive
authority. It mainly highlights the judiciary authority represented in Supreme Judicial
Council, ministry of justice, Supreme Court, Court of Cassation, Judges Club and the
Office of the Attorney General should all be independent and separate from any
inference or supervision from the president or any other institution and only the
Judicial Inspection Authority has the right to inspect on them. Its’ implication that the
party is proclaiming transparent, free judiciary system were no political parties or
ruling party would interfere. This encounters the stereotype facing the Salafis in
society as against the independence of judiciary.
Their final mean to reform the political system is to respect the people’s
choice in choosing the legislative, judiciary, and executive authorities. Written in blue
headline and consist of six paragraphs, this is the longest part they have on their
program.
Unlike the FJP, Al-Nour mentions that elections should be done in choosing
representatives for university and school deans, student union, trade unions and local
councils, governors and elections to be transparent and free. This usage also reflects
the attempt to prioritize the student unions, and universities in as it appears to the
party’s perspective on youth and education and how they weight it in society.
Furthermore, they seek achieving democracy within the framework of Islamic Sharia;
the people have the freedom to form political parties, parties to participate and abide
by the constitution peaceful handover of authority. Also, the freedom in choosing
their representatives, monitor the government performance and its removal. The party
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appears to be trying to promote political freedom and that none of the political parties
will monopolize the scene and this will be accomplished by abiding by Sharia.
They specify launching media and cultural campaigns for raising political
awareness between all social segments especially the youth in educational institutions
and universities, and encouraging them in the decision making process. This usage
also reflects the party’s attempt to balance declining status of political awareness in
society and their interest in investing effort and time in youth as to raise the awareness
and understanding about parties, elections and constitution. Furthermore, Alnour seek
to eliminate the phenomenon of falsifying the peoples will, politically manipulate
them, and orienting all mediums for the sake of a certain political party. They suggest
civil rights groups in order to prevent forging and “buying votes” in elections, unlike
the FJP, who didn’t address such crucial and essential point in the political system in
Egypt.
The party’s last suggestion is to eliminate the passive habits that the society
used to do in previous regimes like exclusion, arrogance, and tyranny that some
political parties used to practice and resulted in the rejection and neglecting of
oppositionist from the scene. The party appears to be trying to show their vision on
respecting opposition and other parties that may disagree with and that all arguments
should be respected.
F. Al-Nour Culture and Identity:
This part is linked from the homepage under the party’s program. The party
focuses on identity as a pivotal issue that should be considered and given attention.
They seek the establishment of a modern state of advanced civilization that combines
tradition and modernity with a civilized message that raise the value of morality and
virtue. Mentioning the word “modern and civilized” addresses the stereotypes Salafis
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faces in society as Muslim extremists that wont believe in modern era and use oldfashion ways in ruling.
They also state the Egyptian identity as an Islamic, Arab identity due to the
Islamic religion, which is a large percentage, and that the Arabic language is the main
language of the people. Furthermore, they suggest that Ministry of Culture, Media,
Education and universities and other governmental and non-governmental institutions
to promote cultural and national identity in all life aspects and that individual should
be proud of their identity. Such points was not targeted by the FJP, and its’
importance is due to the globalization that the society lives in and how the West is
influencing Egyptians; therefore, Al-Nour tries to highlight the protection of the
Egyptian identity as it will support and help in raising our pride.
They also mention, “The nation showed consensus on using Islam, Arabic and
Sharia as means in building a new state.” The party’s usage of the word nation implies
that the people and not the party took the decision on using Sharia. In addition to that,
they acknowledge that Sharia is the main legislative source will help in protecting the
freedoms and rights for not only Copts but also all Egyptians. Finally, they address
the Copts and mention them in their program as to appear to be trying as modest
Islamist group who wants to secure a safe society for Christians and Copts.
Differences in language and structure about the Copts and Coptic Church are found
between both websites. The FJP website concentrates heavily on Christians and
Christian rights, while the Nour website only discusses Christian rights in passing and
relatively superficially.
They move on to suggest the combining of cultural and moral characteristics
in reforming society, as they are involved in the political, economic and social life.
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This usage also reflects the party’s vision on the importance morality and how it
should be used in order to remove all negative habits in society.
Similar to the FJP, Al-Nour mention Al-Azahr as an important and
cornerstone factor in the formation of the public awareness and views and its’
influence reaches not only Egypt but also globally. Both parties agree its’ role has
been declining lately on internal and external issues and in order to restore its
position. There is an agreement in the language and word of choice on both parties,
FJP and Al-Nour, on Al-Azahr as to be independent financially and administration
institution in the state and Sheikh Al-Azhar should be elected and not appointed.
Therefore, there should be a separation between the Sheikh of Al-Azhar and the
university from politics as it should not be a tool used for the ruling party to
brainwash the society. This defines that Al-Nour views separation between religion
and politics and both should not be mixed together.
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V. Chapter Six: Discussion and Limitations
A. Discussion:
The above analysis explains and analyzes the FJP and Al-Nour websites and
how the groups introduced and described themselves. The identified discourses she
light on the parties’ philosophies and visions on crucial issues related to society.
Themes supporting Christians rights were consistent throughout the FJP website. This
is very different from Al-Nour’s website, which rarely discussed Christian issues or
mentioned Christianity. When the FJP was formed and won the majority in the
parliamentary elections, many Christians were worried that the MB would deny their
rights of worship and building churches. It was also the concern of many Western
countries; therefore, the FJP is attempting to show to the Egyptian society their good
will by mentioning:
“Sharia is the best method to ensure the reformation of the conditions of our
society that will lead it to happiness and progress, as well as guaranteeing the rights
of our fellow Christians and their freedom of belief and worship according to their
laws and rules”. In the Political reform program, they state that “freedom of belief
and worship are rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the law, and by Sharia
(Islam law) even before them, and our fellow Christians must not be deprived of the
right to build churches; and that it is essential to find a quick and just solution to the
problems of unauthorized and unlicensed churches”.
The significance to address Christian issues and problems is to show that the
MB is showing care and attention especially with the ever-present threat of antiChristian and anti-Church violence in Egypt. Thus, the FJP appears to be trying to
create a safe and comfortable atmosphere for Christians and to face the stereotypes
that were addressed towards the MB. Arguably, this can also be seen as attempt to try
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and gain votes from Christians, an important minority group in Egypt. The FJP seem
to be both othering and de-othering Christians. They are othering them in the sense
that they create a distinction based on religion. Specifically, they create a distinction
between Muslims and Christians, and, in their conception, Islam is the dominant
religion. However, they de-other Christians to at least some extent by using a moreor-less universal model of citizenship in which both Muslims and Christians are
Egyptian citizens with equal rights and responsibilities. Furthermore, it is notable that
they said the word “sharia” as to indicate to Christians and the people that none of the
MB members, leaders or government official would intervene in ensure the Christians
rights and freedoms. Also, the MB trying to appear as a modest or centralist Islamic
party as to keep the relation close with the US.
However, it is possible that what is written on the FJP website contradicts
other Muslim Brotherhood discourses. For example, Mohammed Badie, the Muslim
Brotherhood's General Guide, mentioned in a 2005 interview with Al-Hayah
newspaper that Copts are “Ahl El Zemma” – meaning Non-Muslims enjoying Muslim
protection (Al Khamisi, 2013). This reflects the ideology and mentality of the MB as
they arguable distinguish Egyptians, at least at some level, based on religion.
Furthermore, some analysts suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood’s actions do not
reflect their inclusive writings about Christians and Christianity (Rossomando, 2013).
More research is needed to determine whether the Freedom & Justice party’s website
discourses about Christians significantly contradicts other official Muslim
Brotherhood discourses about Christians and other non-Muslims, and also about the
Muslim Brotherhood’s policies and actions towards non-Muslims.
Moreover, the FJP’s discussions of Christians and Christianity come in the
context of the Islamic Sharia. Although analysts and Muslims have argued that sharia
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can encompass diverse peoples and respect rights and freedoms, others have argued
that sharia could be dangerous for non-Muslims and even Muslims, particularly if
extremists are allowed to impose narrow interpretations on society.
One of the issues discussed on the FJP is women’s right. Long held
stereotypes that MB are against women rights and participation in the revolution by
going down the streets and demonstrating. Yet, the party states on their website
Ensure women's access to all their rights, consistent with the values of Islamic
law, maintaining the balance between their duties and rights.
This was the only part addressing them in the three selected sections.
However, contradictions were found with the content of the website and real life. The
organization is still conservative and close-minded and prefers women to stay at home
and raise children (Hamed, 2013). In an interview, Ibrahim al-Hudaybi, an Islamist
researcher, mentioned that women are not involved in any “decision making within
the MB organization” (Hamed, 2013).
On the other hand, Al-Nour party rarely mentioned or discussed any rights or
problems that are facing women in Egyptian society. This can be understood, as
mentioned earlier in literature review, that the Salafi groups prefer to have their
women stay at home and not to be exposed to men (Field and Hamam, 2009).
When the Salafis formed the political wing many media channels and political
figures in society accused them of being against freedom of expression, religion and
belief. Even western countries had fears and threats that their relations with Egypt
would be at risk if Salafis were the ruling party.
Therefore, throughout their website Al-Nour appears to be trying to frame
their ideologies in a positive way as to give the influence of being a modest, modern
and democratic Islamic party and challenge the stereotypes, specifically the relation of
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Copts and Muslims in the society. Thus, Al-Nour stated that Copts should be given
the freedom and rights to practice their religious rituals in churches as stated in
Sharia. It is crucial that the party is attempting to appear for Christians as openminded and try and show the Christians the party’s good will and care.
Al-Nour tends to exclude Christians and Christianity. Within the context of an
Islamist ideology, this exclusion can be seen as a type of ideological marginalization
of Egypt's Coptic Christian community. Relating the party’s program to reality,
Sheikh Yassir al-Burhami, a prominent figure in Egypt's Salafi movement said on an
interview on Al-Rahma (“Mercy”) Channel:
“Christians are disbelievers by Allah as shown by the Quran: shall we
apologize for the Quran, and distort its contents, to please them?”
Not only negatively affect the relation between Salafi and Christians but also
Muslims within the society. Furthermore, the party seems to be contradicting itself, as
they appear to be trying to promote freedom for Copts to worship, yet their leaders do
not agree. Such statements reflect that party’s conservative mentality and also a type
of internal contradiction.
B. Limitations:
This study aimed to analyze the websites of the MB and Salafis that are
considered to be two of the most organized, influential political parties in Egypt.
Specifically, the analysis was on sections of the websites that would help the reader to
comprehend the party’s philosophy and vision. Furthermore, the study was aiming to
examine how both parties, MB and Salafi, are addressing and tackling long-held
stereotypes like violence, women’s role and rights in society and human rights.
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The study demonstrated similarities and differences between the FJP and AlNour websites on introducing themselves to the Egyptian people and their political,
religious and cultural programs to develop the country
Due to the fast pace of events happening in the political scene during the last
six months it was difficult to relate the website content with the real world. Also, I
was supposed to analyze the Arabic sections of the FJP website but due to the
political and security instability in the country the Arabic was shut downed and I was
forced to analyze the English version. Furthermore, court verdicts were issued to ban
all activities and organization of MB created to more eruption of violence and
demonstrations in the streets so it was difficult to mention all incidents and relating
the website context to real life.
Future Recommendations:
Many of the discourses that were found on the FJP and Al-Nour website seem
to contradict common stereotypes about Islamists that they are extremely violent, anti
Christian or other religion and do not respect rights and freedom of individuals.
Future research should take an interdisciplinary approach to examine how
closely FJP and Al-Nour official policies reflect the discourses on their websites and
political programs in real life. It is crucial to analyze and examine their agendas,
vision and ideologies on their media. Therefore, I recommend further analysis on
women’s role in society has become very significant after the Jan. 25th revolution.
Thus, examine on how Muslim women are portrayed on Islamist parties websites and
relating the context to real life. Also, examine social networks after June 30th 2013
and how do the Islamist parties introduce themselves to the society. Finally, exploring
and analyzing the framing of Islamists political party on private owned channel and
Islamic channels on televisions.
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